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Abstract: 
The relative cost ratios of facility construction and operations, and the value 
generated from building use have been much debated in recent years. Relative 
values of these ratios are likely different between alternative facility types. 
Empirical analyses of ratio estimates are presented for English secondary schools 
over recent years. Findings challenge established views of the relative cost ratios 
of 1 (construction), 5 (facility management) to 200 (operations or staff), 
suggesting the ratios are actually 1/1/5 respectively. The study also estimates the 
value of investing in schools in terms of improved outcomes, applying educational 
attainment data for rebuilt schools. These are converted into monetary values 
using wage uplift indicators. This produces estimates of expected economic 
benefits (increased productivity and output) and benefits to government via future 
tax receipts (financial return). Findings suggest the present value of future tax 
revenues alone do justify investing in school rebuilding. Average economic 
returns are positive but highly variable, with high dispersion in expected benefits. 
These benefits are positive only in half the rebuilt schools. Results will help 
inform allocation of public resources in schools, while also assisting management 
of the growing independent and semi-autonomous school estate.  
Keywords:  
Schools, whole life cost, cost benefit analysis, building evaluation, human capital. 
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Introduction 
The whole-life cost ratio of 1 Construction /5 Facility Management /200 
Operations staff proposed by many (e.g. Constructing Excellence, 2004) as a rule 
of thumb, first put forward in a paper presented at the Royal Academy of 
Engineering in 1998 (Evans et al., 1998), has been shown to be fundamentally 
misleading both as general benchmark, and for the building type for which it was 
first proposed, London offices (Ive, 2006). The impacts of blindly accepting such 
an inaccurate ‘rule of thumb’ are two fold. First, to misestimate the importance of 
front-end aspects within the control of clients, designers and builders, namely the 
level of construction cost (C), and of facility management costs (F) to operators 
and users, relative to operational staffing costs, (S). Secondly, since it is usually 
part of the claim of the proponents of 1 /5 /200 that the value delivered from a 
new building will exceed its total costs (as it were, ‘exceed 206’) it also misleads 
regarding the size of both C and F relative to a building project’s benefits or value 
(V). 
 
The role of good quality school buildings in determining the outcomes of 
children’s education was asserted as the rationale for the England and Wales 
Building Schools for the Future (BSF) investment programme (DfESi, 2001a; 
Education and Skills Committee, 2007; Crace, 2010). What ‘good’ means in this 
sense is however yet to be comprehensively understood (Barrett et al., 2013). The 
investment case for the BSF programme was based on some evidence 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2003) of a positive relationship between money 
spent on rebuilding and improved educational outcomes. With BSF cancelled as 
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of 2010, public investment in the school estate has become more devolved and 
less co-ordinated, most evident with the controversial Academies and Free 
Schools policies. The need to continually maintain and, when appropriate, rebuild 
school buildings remains, whether that responsibility is taken on by central / local 
government, or, as is increasingly the case, quasi-independent schools. In this new 
context the variance in returns to investment in school renewal could be especially 
important in determining investment decisions and so warrants research.  
 
This paper focuses on two themes within the Call for Papers for this special issue 
of BRI: (1) variance of cost and outcome, and thus in this case the difficulty of 
predicting returns from a school building initiative at project level; and (2) the 
lack of clear method in this programme of projects for policy makers to set 
measurable objectives, predict outcomes and rates of return and assess investment 
outcomes and rates of return ex post. It deals with a situation in which the recent 
national evidence base on costs and consequences of rebuilding English schools 
was necessarily thin ex ante because few English schools had been rebuilt in the 
preceding period. Further, a situation in which even the limited potentially 
available data set was incomplete, unconsolidated and little analysed prior to 
launch of the rebuilding programme. 
 
This paper uses recent data to provide an empirical insight as to the costs and 
effects of some recent school rebuilds, attempting to ascertain what the impact of 
these investments might be on on-going operational cost and on educational 
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outcomes, and to measure rates of return on capital investment. In this paper the 
term ‘rebuilt’ is used as an all-embracing term for: 
a) new building on new site 
b) new building on old site 
c) major refurbishmentii 
 
Factors affecting the uncertain nature of returns to this investment include: 
 School-to-school variance in amount of construction expenditure and in 
the immediate impact on educational performance; 
 The uncertain rate at which this impact will persist / decay over time; 
 Degree of confidence held in the validity of the assumption that past 
correlations between crossing the 5+ GCSEiii A*-C threshold and highest 
qualification eventually obtained, and then between marginal increments 
in level of highest qualification held and lifetime earnings levels will 
persist into the future. 
 
School-by-school findings are applied in an attempt to estimate what might be the 
real net present value (NPV) of each separate investment in schools. Benefits are 
measured as economic benefit, for which enhancement in lifetime earnings per 
former pupil, multiplied by the increment in number of pupils achieving 5+ A*-C 
GCSEs, is used as a proxy for enhanced productivity and output, and such 
increased. This increase in national output is assumed to be the appropriate 
measure of economic benefit from investing in education. Further, a financial 
perspective is considered for the returns to the government as investor in terms of 
increased tax receipts resulting from those higher earnings. 
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Theoretical framework and literature review 
Two literatures and theoretical frameworks are central to this paper. The first 
concerns the returns to investing in rebuilding schools. The second concerns the 
whole life cost approach to buildings, and the average cost structure or average 
ratios between elements of whole life cost. 
Investing in rebuilding schools 
Out of previous research (PwC, 2003, Wing Yin, 2008, Rintala, 2008, 2009, 2010; 
Durbin and Yeshanew, 2010; Williams et al., 2014) a method has developed for 
measuring the impact of rebuilding schools on educational results. Durbin and 
Yeshanew (2010) attempted to compare average levels of exam attainment after 
rebuilding in rebuilt (BSF) schools with those in non-rebuilt schools. The problem 
with this approach is that schools were selected for inclusion in the early rounds 
of BSF precisely because the prior levels of attainment of these schools were 
relatively low. Adjusting for pupils prior attainment (at primary school) fails to 
deal with this problem, and leaves the finding that impact on attainment appears, 
using this method, to be negative. However, one recent study, involving the 
present authors, found the average effect of rebuilding on educational 
performance (as measured by the annual rate of improvement relative to national 
average in the proportion of pupils obtaining 5+ A*-C GCSEs) in the few years 
immediately following rebuilding to be statistically significant and positive 
(Rintala, 2010).  
 
The method developed in this earlier work to measure impact on performance 
involved, first, establishing the national average rate of improvement in GCSE 
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results. This was then taken as a moving benchmark, with the implication that it 
was the rate of improvement that would be expected of a large sample of schools 
in the absence of a capital investment intervention. Actual improvement in the 
sample of rebuilt schools was then measured relative to this national rate (for each 
school in each year performance was measured as ‘x’ percentage points above or 
below the national average for that year, where what was measured in percentage 
points was the proportion of all pupils, nationally or in the school, achieving 5+ 
A*-C GCSEs). For each school, the act of rebuilding was attributed to the single 
most appropriate year. Change in GCSE performance was then measured for 3 
years before and 3 years after the year of renewal. The test for positive effect was 
whether the sample moving average performance in the post-renewal period was 
statistically significantly higher than in the pre-renewal period. This test was 
passed in the sub-sample of rebuilt schools (68 schools) though not in the sub-
sample of refurbished schools (83 schools). The average annual rate of 
improvement relative to benchmark in 151 renewed schools was found to be 1.86 
percentage points over the period and thus 0.46 percentage points per annum over 
in effect 4 years (the two moving averages being anchored respectively on 2 years 
before and 2 years after the year of renewal). All of the secondary schools in this 
earlier study were rebuilt in or prior to 2006 (whereas almost all those rebuilt in 
the data analysed in the present paper were rebuilt after 2006). If rebuilding had 
no effect on attainment (null hypothesis), then the measured annual average rate 
of improvement relative to benchmark in the sample of rebuilt schools would 
reflect only noise, or that the sample was not a random one (since the change in 
the benchmark tells us the mean rate of improvement to be expected in any large 
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random sample of schools). Can this null hypothesis be rejected? The problem is 
that we know that the average attainment of the sample of rebuilt schools started 
below the national average and there may be some general regression to the mean 
at work over time in the relative performance of schools. The magnitude of any 
educational attainment effect of rebuilding is likely to be, at least in part, 
dependent on the school’s position within the initial population of not-rebuilt 
schools. For example, there is likely to be some diminishing return to the positive 
effect on educational attainment from rebuilding when rebuilding schools starting 
at progressively higher levels relative to the national average. 
In this earlier research no data were analysed measuring construction cost, and 
thus no measure of rate of return on investment could be attempted. Nor was it 
possible to see whether amount of construction expenditure correlated with 
amount of performance improvement, other than by the crude division of the 
sample into ‘rebuilt’ versus ‘refurbished’. This found, unlike the rebuilt schools, 
no statistically significant improvement in performance in refurbished schools, in 
which, presumably, construction expenditure had been on average smaller. 
Incorporation of cost data, firstly construction cost but also facility and staffing 
cost, is the obvious requirement to take this approach a crucial step further. 
 
Both this earlier research and the present paper use 5+ A*-C GCSEs as the sole 
measure of educational performance. The primary rationale for this is that this was 
the performance measure favoured by the government of the day, and therefore 
the presumed favoured objective and measure of impact of the BSF programme. 
The secondary reason is the supporting evidence for the idea that this level of 
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GCSE performance constitutes an important ‘hurdle’ for the life chances and 
future earnings of pupils, since there is observed to be a huge difference in the 
probabilities of going on to achieve degree level qualification between those who 
do, and those who do not jump over this hurdle. The third reason is its availability 
as a measure for each secondary school in the country throughout the period 
analysed (whereas, for example, no ‘grade point average’ information is published 
at school level). 
 
The essential feature of this approach is that it involves investigation not of 
average educational performance in rebuilt schools but of the difference in 
performance ‘with’ versus ‘without’ rebuilding. 
Whole life cost and average cost structure of building types 
The applicability of the second theoretical framework in this study, the principles 
of whole life cost (WLC) averages for total cost and for cost structure, is limited 
by the completeness, scope and maturity of available data. Ive (2006) proposed a 
method for calculating whole-life economic cost for a project, divided this into 
initial construction project cost (C), facility management cost (F), and final 
service provision (business operation) cost (S); and reported on observed whole-
life discounted and undiscounted ratios of C to F to S, for London commercial 
offices. It found the undiscounted ratios to be roughly 1/3/30, assuming a 20-year 
economic life for the building; and 1/1.5/15 if future costs were discounted at a 
7% real cost-of-capital discount rate. It concluded for this project type that 
construction costs were much more substantial relative to facility management 
costs and, especially, relative to business occupancy costs, than had been 
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suggested in an influential earlier paper (Evans et al, 1998). Other studies, such as 
(Hughes et al., 2004), have offered strong support for and agreement with the 
finding that the 1/5/200 ratio is profoundly misleading. 
(Insert Table 1 & 2 here) 
 
The current paper accepts the suggestion that  “this common framework can be 
applied to analyse data and calculate mean ratios for buildings of any function” 
(Ive, 2006), and applies similar methods to data for English secondary 
comprehensive schools. Much resource has recently been expended in England on 
rebuilding the schools estate, most especially secondary schools via BSF. To 
estimate expected economic returns ex ante and observe ex post actual returns on 
this investment of resource, knowledge of these whole-life ratios in English 
schools is potentially helpful to policy makers considering the merits of future 
potential investment. 
 
This paper adopts and adapts to schools the whole life cost and value approach to 
offices in Ive (2006). It starts by defining a ‘project’ whose life begins with 
investment in construction of a rebuilt asset (‘building’, C), continues through the 
period of operation to provide ancillary services and require intermediate 
consumption (facility management, F) and operating resources (mainly, staff, S). 
The final product / service leads to valuable outcomes (V), adding to the total 
value of final consumption or to the stocks of capital, including human capital 
(see Table 3). The project ends either when the flow of output ends, or when the 
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built asset is abandoned, and / or redirected to a new use, and / or replaced, 
whichever comes sooner. 
 
This approach makes ‘project life’ equivalent with the economic life of the 
building in its originally conceived use, except that if some of the output takes the 
form of additions to stocks of human capital (as with schools), then the flow of 
benefits, V, may continue after the end of use of the building, until retirement of 
the last former pupils. Such a project has a characteristic profile of flows of 
resource costs and economic benefits (commonly, but only sometimes accurately, 
called the project’s cash flows). The initial outflow is on C, then operating 
outflows on F and S, and inflows of V, such that within the operating period 
annual net inflows are positive (V > {F+S}), allowing a return on investment in C, 
if the discounted value of these net operating period inflows exceeds the present 
value of the initial construction outflow.  
“Resource costs should be counted when they arise, but 
regardless of who incurs them. Resource costs are the quantity of 
scarce resources (with alternative uses) used in the project, 
multiplied by the average opportunity cost of those 
resources…The key distinction is between resource costs and 
financing costs…The resource costs…of a project should be 
invariant to its method of financing. The latter…is subsumed 
under the discount rate (…at which the project’s future resource 
cash flows will be discounted to present value)” 
(Ive, 2006). 
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Project economic benefits can either consist of revenues from a saleable output or 
an estimation of the economic value of project output. The latter applies either if 
output prices diverge from economic value, or if part or all of the output is not 
produced for sale. 
 
The project can either be compared with the situation in which, without it, no flow 
of final outputs will occur, but also no costs of F or S will be incurred, or, with the 
situation where the ‘do-nothing’ comparator involves continuing to produce 
outputs using existing, un-modernised assets. In the latter case (which the authors 
assume to apply to the rebuilt schools) only the differences in F, S and V between 
the ‘invest’ and ‘do nothing’ cases need to be considered in the investment 
appraisal. 
 
In the UK public sector the distinction between what in textbooks are called 
respectively ‘financial’ and ‘economic’ appraisals is known as that between 
‘resource budgeting’ (affordability, actual cash flows of the public sector body; 
how the project will be funded) and ‘appraisal’ (total costs and benefits, including 
externalities, valued at opportunity cost) (HM Treasury, 2011). This paper 
considers both. 
Defining and valuing outcomes of investment in school building 
It is argued here that the final outcome of a school project is not a flow of 
consumption goods or services, but an enhanced stock of ‘human capital’ (Becker, 
1962; Schultz, 1971). Therefore a school project is analogous to a project 
producing as its output an annual flow of fixed capital equipment. If produced 
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capital (of any variety) is not sold at a market price by its producer, then each unit 
of this output in turn needs to be valued based on the discounted value of its 
expected future net returns. If labour market wage / salary differentials allow the 
recipient of an investment in human capital to capture for themselves, and fully, 
the returns from that investment, then the excess of salary ‘with’ that investment 
in their learning over salary as it would have been ‘without’ it may be used to 
measure the ‘market value of education’. Of course, this narrow definition cannot 
fully capture individual enrichment as a quality of life issue, as socialisation and 
as contributing to 'good citizenship'. 
 
In practice, impatience to estimate returns, and the absence of a ‘futures market’ 
in the value of human capital, means that potential ‘investors’ in education look 
for a measure of the output that will be available more quickly than the outcome 
increment to lifetime earnings of students. The proxy measure most commonly 
used is enhancement of examination results. This seems to mistake the signal 
(exam result) for the thing thus imperfectly signalled (knowledge, learning, 
development). However, it may be true that ex-students will successfully use their 
examination results to signal the latter non-observed attributes to others (Akerlof, 
1970). 
 
The Green Book (HM Treasury, p14, 2011), provides a range of examples of the 
difference between outputs and outcomes, as illustrated in Table 3. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
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At the time of the BSF programme, the measure of exam results favoured by 
government was the proportion of pupils in a school obtaining at least 5 GCSE 
grades A*-C. To use this as the only measure of output is to assume in effect that 
schools are ‘gaming the system’ by which they are held to account by 
government, and that change in pupil attainment is concentrated upon ‘marginal 
cases’ of pupils lifted over this particular threshold, because this is where schools 
focus their marginal efforts. A less cynical view would be that an increase in the 
5+ A*-C proportion is merely an imperfect signal of a general average 
improvement in attainment across all pupils (including, for example, the turning 
of C grade results into A and B grades, and of Bs into As and As into A*s). If this 
is the case, then using the 5+ A*-Cs proportion to measure the improvement in 
human capital will produce a serious under-estimate. 
 
However, not only is there no available school-by-school data on weighted 
average grade results, but also the ‘threshold’ approach to increments in 
qualifications achieved has a certain appeal and logic. Crossing a threshold opens 
up an option to move on to the next level of education, an option that pupils may 
or may not take. The greatest returns in terms of increments to lifetime earnings 
come for those who cross a succession of thresholds (at age 16 and 18), take up 
the resulting options, and end with university honours degrees or above (level 4+ 
qualifications). Since it is known from recent studies (HEFCE, 2010; OECD, 
2011) what proportion of the age cohort nationally end with university degrees, 
and what proportion end with level 3 (A levels or their vocational or other 
equivalent) as their highest qualification, and what proportion end with level 2 (5+ 
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A*-C GCSE or vocational equivalents) as their highest qualification, it can then 
be assumed that the extra pupils crossing the level 2 threshold are subsequently 
‘typical’ of the average of all pupils crossing that threshold in order to estimate 
final outcomes.  
 
Of every 100 school pupils, x fail to cross the level 2 threshold. Of the 100 – x 
crossing the level 2 threshold, y obtain no further qualification. Of the 100 – x – y 
who proceed to level 3, z stop at level 3, leaving 100 – x – y – z to proceed to level 
4. 
National qualification statistics enable a direct observation of the following:  
 100 – x – y – z: numbers and proportion of age group obtaining degrees 
(31.9%, OECD, 2011) 
 100 – x – y: numbers and proportion of the age group obtaining A levels or 
equivalent (37.2%, DfE, 2012) 
 100 – x: numbers and proportion of the age group obtaining 5+ A*-C 
GCSEs (62.8%, DfE, 2013) 
From these observed proportions, the values of y (25.6%) and z (5.3%) can be 
deduced. It can then be assumed that for each extra 62.8 pupils crossing the level 
2 threshold (see above), 25.6 stop there (62.8 – 37.2), 5.3 go on to A levels but 
then stop there (37.2 – 31.9), and 31.9 go on to get degrees. These can be 
converted into percentages summing to 100, and thus into weights. These weights 
therefore are 0.408 (W2 – see Equation 1 below), 0.084 (W3) and 0.508 (W4). 
 
Lifetime earning increments for each level of qualification achieved are available, 
produced by comparing earnings of each level of highest qualification with 
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earnings of those with only level 1 qualifications (Walker and Zhu, 2013). The 
proportions 25.6/62.8 (W2), 5.3/62.8 (W3) and 31.9/62.8 (W4) then become the 3 
‘weights’ used, to obtained a weighted average uplift in the lifetime earnings of 
each marginal 100, as compared to what they would have been had all 100 
obtained only level 1 qualifications. 
Assumptions and estimation – problems in the method for measuring 
and valuing outcomes 
Table 4 below summarises the reasons why estimations of outcome values might 
differ from those that actually occur. These are broken down by whether they 
might lead to over or under estimation, as well as their source in terms of either 
being purely the consequence of fundamental and unavoidable Keynesian 
uncertainty (see quote below), those for which better data would assist, and those 
that are the consequence of the particular method used here, of valuing the effect 
of pupils crossing a qualification threshold.  Further discussion of these important 
considerations from a policy design perspective is included in Appendix 1. 
 (INSERT TABLE 4) 
Investment considerations 
Compared with most physical investment, the returns expected from renewing 
schools continue exceptionally far into the future. If effects on pupil GCSE 
attainment persist for 20 years, and those pupils on leaving school then work for 
40 years, then the effects on productivity, UK gross domestic product (GDP), 
output, and earnings will be supposed to continue for 60 years post-investment. 
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Thus Keynes’ dictum applies with particular force, especially if schools no longer 
operate as monopolies but face competition from other schools: 
“Our knowledge of the factors which will govern the yield of an 
investment some years hence is usually very slight and often 
negligible. If we speak frankly, we have to admit that our basis of 
knowledge for estimating the yield ten years hence of a railway, a 
copper mine…the goodwill of a patent medicine…a building in 
the City of London amounts to very little and sometimes to 
nothing…. (and)…if we exclude the exploitation of natural 
resources and monopolies, it is probable that the actual average 
results of investments, even during periods of progress and 
prosperity, have disappointed the hopes which prompted them…If 
human nature felt no temptation to take a chance, no satisfaction 
(profit apart) in constructing…there might not be much 
investment merely as a result of cold calculation”.  
(Keynes, Chapter 12, 1936) 
To this, if the ‘public choice theory’ observation is added that in the case of the 
schools programme, those making the decision to invest are not investing and 
risking their own money, but that of the taxpayers, it might then not be surprising 
that there does not appear to exist any clear basis for confident calculation of 
returns to investment in schools, but that such investment nonetheless occurs. 
England's school rebuilding programme 
The commitment to increased spending on school buildings, which was in 2004 to 
become BSF, began in a small way. In the 1998 Budget, £90 million of capital 
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funding was allocated: £35 million to remove the outside toilets still being used at 
600 schools; £15 million to allow up to 500 schools to replace or improve their 
inefficient heating systems; and £40 million to provide extra classrooms to help 
the Government to deliver on its pledge that no child of 5, 6 or 7 should be taught 
in a class of more than 30 children. This was presented largely as the Government 
intending to address a backlog of maintenance and repairs in the schools sector, 
although the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) did note that the 
improvements to heating systems would reduce fuel used and assist in reducing 
CO2 emissions. In 1999 and 2000, various further announcements were made in 
what was known as the New Deal for Schools, all of which focused on the repairs 
backlog and the replacement of temporary classrooms (House of Commons, 2007, 
pg. 10). Up to this point, objectives were therefore more in terms of assuring a 
‘decent’ minimum standard of facilities for all, rather than obtaining economic 
benefits. 
 
The capital programme took on a different dimension later in 2000. In September, 
the Department announced capital expenditure of £7.8 billion for the years 2001-
02 to 2003- 04. This funding was to be used to completely transform or replace 
650 schools, both primary and secondary. By this time the Government had 
committed approximately £10 billion to be spent on school repairs and rebuilding 
since coming into office. 
 
In January 2001, for the first time, the then Secretary of State also drew attention 
to the ‘performance’ case (DfES, 2001) referring to research undertaken by 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC, 2001). Later empirical work by PwC further 
supported the claim that capital investment is associated with educational 
attainment (PwC, 2003). The House of Commons Education Skill Committee later 
referred back to Department’s belief that:  
“Capital investment impacts positively on pupil performance, 
particularly in terms of improving teacher morale and motivating 
pupils”. The research referred to actually said “[...] on balance, the 
research suggests that, where there are statistically significant effects of 
capital on performance, these are positive.” 
 (Education and Skills Committee, 2007) 
 
In a speech by David Miliband, then Minister of State for School Standards, in 
October 2002, the redevelopment of schools was put forward explicitly as a means 
of improving educational standards (House of Commons, 2007, pg. 11). 
Improvement of educational performance had become the main aim of and 
justification for the rebuilding programme. However, the criteria by which 
improved performance outcomes should be measured, to allow ex ante appraisal 
and ex post evaluation of the programme, were never made explicit. Whilst the 
government of the time had many goals for education, including those embodied 
in Every Child Matters: Change for Children (HM Government, 2003) of 
promoting and securing child health, safety, attendance at school, and behavior, as 
well as economic well-being through employment, in this paper the focus is 
therefore solely upon the last of these policy goals. 
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In 2004 BSF was launched. Building Schools for the Future was an ambitious 
programme designed to rebuild or refurbish all secondary schools in England over 
15 years at a cost of £45 billion, with local authorities participating in a series of 
15 ‘waves’. As well as being a project to improve radically the fabric of school 
buildings and provide massive investment in information and communication 
technologies (ICT), it was intended that it would transform the educational 
experiences of pupils (House of Commons, 2007, pg. 4). The Commons’ Select 
Committee stated: “Investment in the three decades before BSF was announced 
had been minimal, meaning that there were very few architects, procurement 
experts or head teachers in the system with experience to build on. Even the 
research base has little to tell us about how we should design sustainable learning 
environments for the future” (House of Commons, 2007, pg. 12). 
 
The original intention of the BSF programme seems to have been to have a clear 
split between new build schools which would be created and maintained under 
PFI contracts, and refurbished schools which would be the subject of DBOM 
contracts (Design, Build, Operate and Maintain). In most cases DBOM became 
just ‘Design and Build’, with or without separate facilities management (FM) 
contracts. In addition, many of the schools originally expected to be procured 
under PFI became conventional capital projects using Design and Build contracts. 
What is an appropriate discount rate for schools projects? 
The Treasury Green Book (only mandatory for central government departments 
and agencies, but recommended to local authorities and other public bodies) lays 
down 3.5% real discount rate to reflect social time preference (Table 5); with 
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additional adjustment to the cash flows rather than to the discount rate to offset 
optimism bias in forecasts of cash flows. It also lays down that: 
 “The valuation of costs or benefits should be expressed in ‘real terms’ or 
‘constant prices’ (i.e. at ‘today’s’ general price level), as opposed to 
‘nominal terms’ or ‘current prices’.” (section 5.42). 
 “Where particular prices are expected to increase at significantly higher or 
lower rate than general inflation, this relative price change should be 
calculated.” 
 “For projects with very long-term impacts, over thirty years, a declining 
schedule of discount rates should be used rather than the standard discount 
rate.” (section 5.51). It cites Weitzman (1998) and Gollier (2002) and their 
findings on the effect of uncertainty as its authorities for this declining 
rate. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
The paper applies Green Book guidance on discount rate, except in respect of the 
declining long-term rate. Here, because the change would only be from 3.5% to 
3% for years 30 to 60, it was simpler to apply 3.5% throughout. 
Research method 
The following section details how the cost and value ratios and estimated rates of 
return on investment presented have been calculated. Much of the work required 
for their calculation is in bringing different datasets together, as well as cleaning, 
indexing and normalising data. Estimates from periods of time before and after 
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capital works are used to generate future cash flows for present value analysis. 
There follow separate sections on the processes for calculation of the concepts of 
C, F, S and V (and their normalised per pupil capacity equivalents c, f, s and v). 
Data sources 
The analysis focuses on a core sample of schools for which there is credible 
capital expenditure sums (C), as well as sub-samples for the other concepts that 
are limited by availability of data for expenditures and educational outcomes. A 
summary list of the datasets used and the information derived from each is given 
in Table 6. 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
Edubase 
Since data per school has to be analysed across datasets, and the most comparable 
data is for 2012 and earlier, it was decided to take the population of schools from 
an early 2012 Edubase extract. Another key bit of information provided within the 
Edubase dataset is pupil capacity. This is used as the main normaliser for headline 
expenditures, in part because it is widely reported at the school level. There will 
be variance in the capacity utilisation between schools (pupils on roll / pupil 
capacity). This will be a source of some variance in expenditures, but is unlikely 
to be so significant as to affect the overall orders of magnitude for the key ratios. 
A simple analysis of capacity utilisation within a sub-sample of schools is 
provided. 
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School Building Survey (SBS) 
The latest available survey of school buildings is from 2011. However, the 
reported actual and planned capital expenditure data is only included in the 2009 
survey. Given that at least 3 years post rebuild data (cost and educational 
outcomes) is required to estimate much of the associated effects of rebuilding, the 
use of the 2009 survey is appropriate in identifying the relevant schools. Almost 
all of the schools analysed received their capital investment between the years 
2006 and 2011 with the mode in 2010 (see Figure 1). The benefit of the capital 
expenditure data provided in this data source is that it allows a move from a 
discrete analysis (i.e. looking at whether a school has received rebuilding works 
(Rintala, 2010)) to a continuous analysis of the resource cost expended on such 
works (reported as an ‘estimated or actual cost of works’). The impending 
publication of a larger, more comprehensive survey of the schools estate will 
allow for more advanced and insightful analysis (see recommendations for further 
research). 
Consistent Financial Reporting (CFR) 
CFR reports expenditures for some elements of capital budgets. Previous 
investigation of these found them to be wholly unreliable. This is likely the result 
of this dataset pertaining only to school level expenditure, and as local 
government authorities in this period typically delivered the vast majority of 
capital investment for English schools, it is not surprising this data fails to 
properly account for significant rebuilding. Use of CFR data for OPEX analysis 
has previously proved insightful (Edkins et al., 2011), so long as adequate checks 
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are made to ensure complete provision of data by each included school in the 
range of expenditure categories. CFR data was collated to cover a period from 
2002/03 to 2012/13. 
Educational attainment tables 
The present paper uses school-specific changes in attainment to calculate the 
average overall change. These changes in attainment are then multiplied by 
estimates of the future net lifetime wage uplifts, resulting from educational 
attainment, to produce a measure of the economic benefit associated with 
rebuilding works. 
Display Energy Certificates (DEC) 
All buildings occupied by public authorities are now subject to surveys of their 
sustainability characteristics. Some of the schools within the samples have been 
surveyed to produce these certifications (from 2008 – 2012), which usefully 
provide data on the Total Useable Floor Area (TUFA). This is used to help 
provide a sense of the variability in the ratio of pupils on roll to usable floor 
space. TUFA is not used consistently as a normaliser as the coverage of this data 
for the schools being considered is not sufficient to maintain large sample sizes. 
This will improve in the coming years as more of the school estate is subject to 
these surveys. 
Collation of data between sources 
To assist further research with the range of datasets, the best method of dealing 
with issues arising when collating across them is considered. Within the datasets, 
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schools have two unique identifiers, their unique reference number (URN) and 
their local authority / establishment number (LAESTAB). LAESTAB was found 
to result in superior matching between datasets and was generally preferred. 
Sampling and data preparation 
1. A complete list of just under 69,000 educational establishments in England 
and Wales was obtained from Edubase. The number of secondary schools 
within the dataset was 5,347. The dataset was filtered by admission type to 
include only comprehensives. This left 4,159 schoolsiv. A large number of 
schools not reporting admission type, including schools under Welsh 
administrations, are excluded. 
2. 658 schools were seemingly repeated within this population. These were 
removed to leave 3501. A further 336 were recorded as having closed before 
September 2002. These were also removed to leave a population of 3,165 
secondary comprehensive schools. There will remain some schools that have 
since closed, but these are left in as they may have usable interim data. 
3. These 3,165 schools were then cross-matched with the SBS 2009 (and 2011)v. 
This identified which schools had received (or were soon due) significant 
capital works amounting to ‘rebuilding’ between financial years 1992/93 and 
2011/12. This isolated some 556 schools. 
4. These 556 schools formed the core sample of ‘rebuilt’ schools, from which 
further sub-samples were taken driven by availability of additional data.  
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Variables 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX): variable C 
The estimates for cost of works come from SBS 2009 as the answer to the 
question ‘Actual or estimated total cost of works at school?’. Of the 556 schools 
identified as renewed using the SBS 2009, only 266 reported a sum for works 
done, or soon to be done. Working with this data revealed some worrying issues 
even when normalised by some indicator of school size. In an attempt to clean the 
data, an estimated expected CAPEX was calculated for each school, to be 
compared with that reported. The method for this estimation is given in the Table 
7. 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
This estimated CAPEX per school (the result from Step 2) was then regressed 
against reported CAPEX to investigate how well they correlated. This analysis 
revealed a raft of data points far too low to be considered as reasonable sums for 
significant works. These were identified by use of reasonable lower and upper 
limits and removed from the samples. This revealed a sub-sample of 166 schools 
(C:166, of the 266 that reported a sum) that had credible sums for CAPEX, which 
were taken forward for further analysis. To normalise the CAPEX data, pupil 
capacity was used. TUFA may have been more appropriate but is available for 
less than 50% of these 166 schools at present. 
Operating expenditure (OPEX): variables F and S 
For the 166 schools with credible CAPEX the associated expenditure data for 
each school was retrieved in accordance with the process below: 
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The Consistent Financial Reporting (CFR) dataset for financial years 2002/03 to 
20012/13 was obtained from the DfE. There is thus a maximum of eleven years 
cost data potentially available for a specific school, if it was renewed before 
2002/03; reducing to a minimum of one year following rebuilding if it was 
renewed in 2011/12. 
Facility occupancy costs: F 
From the range of available expenditure lines, an occupational cost basket was 
created. The components of the basket, and corresponding CFR references for 
clarity, includevi: 
1. Premises staff (E04); 
2. Building maintenance (E12); 
3. Grounds maintenance (E13); 
4. Cleaning and caretaking (E14); 
5. Catering staff (E06); 
6. Catering Supplies (E25) 
7. Water and sewerage (E15); 
8. Energy (E16); 
9. Other insurance premiums (E23); 
10. Other occupational cost (E18) 
11. ICT learning resources (E20) 
12. Bought in professional services - (E28); 
Expenditures were converted to constant 2009 prices using the Retail Price Index 
excluding mortgage payments (RPIX) index (Dept. for Business, Innovation and 
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Skills, 2013). The expenditures for each school were divided by the school’s pupil 
capacityvii for normalisation. Data for each school were rearranged into elapsed 
time from the year the school underwent rebuilding using the date of capital works 
from the SBS as a point of reference. 
The F cost data were sampled separately for each school in elapsed years 
following rebuilding. A school was only included in the analysis if it had returns 
for all of the above expenditures. This was an attempt to minimise the possibility 
of bad reporting between expenditure categories. 
Staffing costs: S 
The staffing cost variable is sourced from CFR data. The expenditures included to 
make this variable include the following: 
 Teaching Staff (E01); 
 Supply teacher staff (E02); 
 Education support staff (E03); 
 Administration and Clerical staff (E05) 
A similar method to that used for F was applied to produce cash flows for S. 
Lifespan 
For the ratio analyses, three years post construction data for F and S were 
averaged to produce annual estimates. These were then projected forward to 
produce 60 years of cash flows representing the asset life for which F and S are 
relevant. These are then discounted at both 3.5% (social time preference) and 7% 
(alternative discount rate allowing like for like comparison to commercial offices).  
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Investment Appraisal 
The trend in F and S from before to after rebuilding was then compared to the 
benchmark trend in F and S for all 3,165 schools in the sample, to calculate ΔF 
and ΔS associated with rebuilding. 
Economic and financial value of outcomes: V & T 
 
The educational impact associated with rebuilding was calculated based on the 
observed difference in school reported achievement at level 2 (% of students 
achieving at least 5 A*-C GCSEs, (Dept. for Education, 1998 - 2013) relative to 
national benchmarks. This was then used to calculate the earnings effects of the 
change in educational outcomes based on two key concepts. The first is the 
proportion of students obtaining 5+ A*-C GCSEs going on to higher levels of 
qualifications (HEFCE, 2010; OECD, 2011) The second is the associated earnings 
differentials for individuals obtaining those levels of academic qualifications 
(Garrett et al., 2010, Dickerson et al., 2007). The wage differentials for vocational 
qualifications are not applied within the model for the analysis below, but are 
available for future analyses (Jenkins et al., 2007, McIntosh et al., 2009). 
For the estimation of future cash flows based on educational outcomes, the 3 years 
following rebuilding were used to generate the first 3 years of cash flows, with the 
remaining 57 years (60 years in total) based on an average difference in the first 
three years after compared to the three years before rebuilding.  
Equation 1: Example determination of ‘v’ cash flow in tn: 
SPC´EAD´DFR[ ]´ WUlv1-lv2 ´W2( )+ WUlv1-lv3 ´W3( )+ WUlv1-lv4 +W4( )éë ùû{ }+CFt-1  
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SPC  = School pupil capacity 
EAΔN  = Educational outcome change against national average 
DFR  = Decay function of rebuilding’s effect on EAΔN 
WUlvn = Wage uplift at attainment level n relative to level 1 (where n is 2, 3 or 4) 
W2, W3 and W4 = Proportion of pupils attaining level 2 with attainment at levels  
2, 3 and 4 as their highest qualification (see earlier Method section) 
CFt-1 = Previous period cash flow  
 
The first pair of brackets, that is [ ], gives the number of pupils affected. The 
content of the second set of brackets gives the estimated average wage uplift per 
pupil affected.  
An assumed 40-year working life of former pupils is used, such that in year t41, 
the first cohort of students to benefit from the rebuilt asset (t1) will retire, and 
hence their contribution to the cash flows becomes zero, and so forth for later 
cohorts.  
The decay of the educational benefit associated with the rebuilding is assumed 
such that after 20 years of operation, its effect is zero. That is, over years t4 – t20, 
any change in educational outcomes (and their effect on the cohorts of students 
graduating from the school) returns to zero on a straight-line basis. The assumed 
decay of this effect will be a key sensitivity in the determination of V. 
These cash flows are again discounted at 3.5% for economic and financial benefit 
analysis. The financial benefit, T (for tax revenue), to Treasury (as the potential 
investor facing affordability constraints as well as a choice of investing in a 
myriad of competing projects) has been estimated by multiplying the economic 
benefit by a notional tax rate of 0.4 (a rough estimate for longer term income tax, 
national insurance and VAT). 
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The resulting values of V and T should be interpreted within the context of the 
assumptions used within the analysis, given the potential for key determinants to 
change. Table 8 summarises the final sample sizes and period coverage of the 
above variablesviii. 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
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Analysis 
Before considering the results of the cost ratio and investment appraisal analysis, 
it might be useful to consider the sample of schools studied. Figure 1 is a time 
series of the annual reported C and number of schools receiving investment within 
the C:166 sample. As is clear, the majority of these schools were renewed 
between 2009 and 2011. Further, the majority of these schools (116) are reported 
within the SBS as BSF works, with additional schools reported  as PFI contracts, 
which may also additionally be part of the BSF programme. The number of 
schools identified as part of PFI contracts is insufficient for further detailed 
analysis of mean and variance by PFI / other procurement route.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
Cost structure 
The key findings on average cost ratios, for English secondary schools as a whole, 
discounted at the Treasury recommended public sector rate of 3.5% real, and over 
an assumed asset life of 60 years, are that the discounted ratio of F to S is 1/5.5; 
and for recently rebuilt schools the discounted ratio of C to F to S is 1/0.8/4.5. For 
like-for-like comparison with London offices, a comparable discount rate of 7% 
was also applied. Results for this are C 1 to F 0.5 to S 2.5 for schools, to be 
compared with C 1 to F 1.5 to S 15 for offices. 
 
The much higher ratio of C to S in schools than in offices, the higher ratio of C to 
F in schools than in offices (1 to 0.5 or 1 to 0.8 in schools, depending on the 
discount rate used, compared to 1 to 1.5 in offices), and the higher ratio of F to S 
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in schools (1/5 compared to 1/10) all have implications for where and how 
‘smarter’ investment in C might pay off in cost savings. This suggests that, as 
with commercial offices, whilst it is still the less well understood and less 
predictable relationships between spending on C and consequent savings in S that 
could be crucial, rather than the more well modelled relationships between 
spending on C and potential saving on F, the latter could be relatively more 
important compared to the former in schools than in offices. 
 
The lower ratio of (F + S) / C in schools (5.3/1 when discounted at 3.5%; 3/1 
when discounted at 7%) compared to offices (16.5/1) implies that, overall and on 
average, it will be even ‘harder’ than in offices to design schools projects so that 
savings on F and S (in rebuilt schools in comparison to non-rebuilt) cover the cost 
of investing in C, the cost of rebuilding. This is so despite using a longer assumed 
asset life for schools (60 years) compared to offices (20 years).  A subsequent 
paper will report some findings on this last point. 
  
As can be seen from Table 9, the present value (discounted at 3.5%) of reported c 
to estimated f and s is, as a stylised representation, 1:1:5 on a per pupil capacity 
basis, their approximate values being: c = £20k; f = £16k; s = £91k. 
(Insert Table 9 here) 
The values of f and s (as the PV of future cash flows) of course reduce when 
discounted at the higher rate of 7%, producing stylized cost ratios of 1:0.5:2.5.  
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An additional benefit of this analysis is that it yields, in addition to averages, an 
insight into the variance of these costs about their mean. More information on the 
variance about average c is presented below, but the standard deviations and 
means in Table 9 indicate that facility maintenance costs per pupil seem to vary 
comparatively more between schools than do staffing costs per pupil. 
It can be seen from Table 10 below that capacity utilization (in the sample of 
C:166) has some considerable variability about its mean of 0.87. There are 
seemingly schools that are over utilized at the upper limit of the distribution (100th 
percentile = 1.97) and others that are under utilized (10th percentile = 0.61). These 
are likely the schools driving most of the variance in f. 
(Insert Tables 10 and 11 here) 
Table 12 below provides average construction cost per Gross Internal floor Area 
(GIFA) m2 for BSF schools in 2009 prices. This additional data was obtained 
from the DfE after the main analysis had been completed. It may therefore 
provide a useful cross-check on the representativeness of the research sample. Its 
use in this way is justifiable given the prevalence of BSF schools within our 
sample. With some interpretation, it can be compared to the sample data above, in 
Table 10. If the TUFA per pupil on roll average ratio from Table 10 (9.24 m2) is 
used as a factor to transform per m2 costs into a value on a per pupil basis, then 
the typical capacity utilisation rate can be applied. This provides a rough estimate 
on a pupil capacity basis. A reasonable average value of construction cost per 
GIFA m2 from Table 12 might be £2,400. Multiplying this by 8.62 (weighted 
mean TUFA per pupil on roll 2012, from Table 10) gives £20,688 cost per pupil 
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on roll. Multiplying this by the average capacity utilisation rate (0.86, from Table 
10 above) gives £17,792 as construction cost per unit pupil capacity when 
estimated from DfE BSF data in Table 12, a figure comparable with that estimated 
in this current analysis (£19,982, as shown in Table 11)ix. There are of course 
considerable deviations from the averages within the ratios applied, and there is 
almost certainly some consistent difference, if small, between TUFA and GIFA 
(net to gross floor area). As shown in Table 12, there are considerable economies 
of scale in construction costs for school facilities, with a facility between 12,000-
14,000 m2 costing two thirds that of a facility between 0-2,000 m2 on a per m2 
basis. 
(Insert Table 12 here) 
By analysing time series of average levels of f and s (lower case being per pupil 
capacity concepts) over a large sample of secondary comprehensives (n=3,165), 
an insight is provided into their actual annual cost and their change through time. 
It can be seen that while the average ratio of f:s of 1:5 remains a valid 
approximation through time, there is some recent tendency for the exact ratio to 
rise (that is, for f to increase relative to s). If f expenditure increases at a quicker 
rate than that on s, the ratio will increase. Compare the rough ratios for 2002/03 to 
that of 2012/13 indicated in Figure 2. Whereas in 2002/03 f of £500 to s of £2,800 
gives a 1:5.6 ratio, 2012/13 f of £700 to s of £3,300 gives a 1:4.7 ratio, i.e. 
substantially higher relative expenditure on f. The driver in this divergence is the 
prevalence of years in which f increased more than s. Despite this short period 
finding, the analysis below uses the assumption that over a long enough period, 
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changes in prices for f and s will be roughly neutral. Although public sector’s pay, 
specifically teachers’ pay, has remained considerably below inflation for the years 
following the global financial crisis, it is assumed that teachers’ pay will in time 
seeing real wage increases, and thus track facility management costs. 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
Investment rates of return: from cost structure averages to rebuild / 
not-rebuild cost and value differences 
Beside the calculation of cost ratios presented above, a key intention of this paper 
is to provide some indication, however imperfect the data and method, of the 
returns to investing in school buildings. This is in an attempt to inform the future 
investment policies of those involved in capital expenditure in such facilities. 
Table 13 shows the equivalent average values of Δc, Δf and Δs resulting from 
rebuilding. That is the change associated with rebuilding relative to not-
rebuilding, rather than absolute magnitude. Their sampling and estimation is 
described in the method section. It is relevant to restate that the estimation of F 
and S requires additional data to that for C, and as such they represent sub 
samples of C:166. The observed c above remains as Δc (as c is zero in the case of 
not-rebuilding), while the PV of Δf and Δs in Table 13 is estimated from data 
following rebuilding. As can be seen, even with 60 years of estimated cash flows, 
the difference in f and s relative to the benchmark of non-rebuilt schools is 
negligible. This suggests that overall, rebuilding has seemingly little discernable 
impact on ongoing expenditures on f and s in the schools measured. This may be a 
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simplification of the real long-term impact of rebuilding on these expenditures, as 
this is based on only a few years post-rebuilding data.  
Both Δf and Δs are negative (indicating a cost rather than saving), i.e. F and S are 
slightly higher after renewal than they would have been without renewal. Thus, 
far from cost savings in F and S resulting following investment in C, they actually 
increase, albeit only by small amounts. 
(Insert Table 13) 
As can be seen from Table 13, the overall estimated economic return to investing 
in schools as measured by expected increases in earnings (a proxy for increased 
productivity) for those achieving better educational outcomes greatly exceeds the 
PV of outward cash flows, at the order of 3.4 to 1 (discount rate 3.5%). Even the 
Exchequer makes an overall net gain on the investment (1.36 to 1). 
The reality of this expected long-run return from investment in schools will 
depend on the actual future in which those gaining level 2 qualifications will live 
and work. This may turn out to be very different from that assumed in this 
analysis, but consideration of this point is fundamental to optimal policy design. If 
policy makers have reason to believe that key assumptions regarding the links 
between qualifications and lifetime earnings will be different in future than they 
have been in the recent past, they can take explicit account of this.  
However, while these results regarding average return on resources invested may 
be regarded as justification of the BSF programme, another aspect of the findings 
(Figure 3 below) may equally be regarded as ammunition for its critics. For they 
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show that almost all the benefits will flow from just one-third of schools included 
in the programme and thus from less than half of the total expenditure. The 
average C in the schools in the top percentiles for performance improvement is 
higher than the average C for all schools in the sample. This is because C tends to 
be higher in rebuilt than in refurbished schools, and performance impact is 
significantly greater in the rebuilt schools. Hence the share in total expenditure 
yielding almost all the benefits is higher than the share in number of rebuilt 
schools. 
The position of the time curve for V per annum for each school evidently depends 
upon a variable (amount of improvement in school exam results) multiplied by a 
constant (value put on a unit of improvement). Figure 3 reflects and shows that 
there was no observed improvement in exam results (deducting national average 
trends) in the three years post-construction in half of all the rebuilt schools. 
(Insert Figure 3 here) 
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Conclusions 
Cost ratios 
On average and typically for all schools, at present over their lifetime discounted f 
(£16k per pupil) is smaller than c (£20k per pupil).  Therefore, even if it were 
claimed (completely implausibly) that a new building could not only generate all 
its own energy requirement but eliminate F altogether, that on its own would still 
not make a case for investment in C, unless the project were to involve untypically 
low C, or unless in future the inputs driving F were expected to rise dramatically 
in relative price. Though as (at £91k per pupil) is nearly 5 times the level of C, the 
linkages between C and S remain both poorly understood and weak. 
 
Cost ratios for schools are very different to those found for offices. Because the 
built space in offices is mainly rather intensively occupied by employees, causing 
S to be some 15 times the size of C, project business cases suggesting that 
expenditure on C might pay for itself by achieving savings in S are not prima facie 
implausible. However, unlike offices, the great majority of costly-to-construct 
built space in schools is not occupied by paid employees, but by pupils. This 
results in a much higher ratio of floor area per employee in schools than in offices. 
This fact alone (rather than any difference in average salaries between teachers 
and office workers or in cost of construction per square metre) explains the 
greatest part of the difference in ratio of S to C in the two building types.  
 
Thus in the case of schools, it is difficult to make a business case for construction 
investment on the basis of payback in savings on S and F. The rebuilt school 
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would have to reduce combined costs of S and F by 20% compared with what 
they would be without rebuilding. The evidence is that, on average, S and F are 
slightly higher, and certainly not 20% lower, in rebuilt rather than in non-rebuilt 
schools. Instead the case must use potential increases in V to justify increased C. 
Returns on investment  
Where positive returns arise it is from improvement in educational performance. 
In some renewed schools, the improvement in examination results is substantial. 
However, at least half the rebuilt schools under study witnessed no increase in 
educational attainment relative to national average benchmarks. To place the 
assessment of BSF investments into context, the following quotation seems 
appropriate: 
“Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the trouble is 
I don't know which half”. 
 
Variously attributed to John Wanamaker, US department store merchant 
(1838 - 1922) or to 1st Viscount Leverhulme, founder of Lever Brothers 
(1851-1925). 
If the findings of this paper were to be regarded as a definitive evaluation, then to 
those wanting to be critical of the BSF programme, it might seem that, with 
addition of ‘in advance’ before ‘which half”, this quotation is relevant from a 
policy perspective.  
On the other hand, the strongly positive average benefit-cost ratio for all renewed 
schools suggests that not investing at all (or cutting back investment in school 
building to its pre-2000 level) is not economically efficient either. 
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It is necessary to insist not only upon the usual caveats regarding a need for 
further research, and the need to wait for more years’ data, but also to clarify that 
rather than being an attempt at definitive evaluation, the whole purpose of the 
‘investment’ section of this paper has been to show how far short we still are of 
having method and data for such an evaluation. The results reported here follow 
from a series of assumptions made necessary by that lack, and its claim to value 
must lie in making those assumptions and the problems intrinsic to such 
evaluation more explicit. 
 
It seems only fair to assert that this lack of understanding and measurement of 
longer-term determinants of project value comes at a cost. This cost includes less 
than optimal policy design and delivery, even when evaluated by the current 
prescribed forms of project and programme evaluation. The breadth of the 
assumptions required to undertake these analyses, along with the relatively limited 
samples supporting them, serve to highlight the potential insight future appraisals 
with more adequate data could provide. 
Further Research 
If it was not already apparent, this paper demonstrates that the determination of 
educational outcomes is a complex affair, let alone their future value. While the 
role of secondary school buildings may only play a relatively small part in the 
determination of educational outcomes (Leckie et al., 2010), as a high profile area 
of public policy, there will no doubt be further contention about the optimal 
amounts and methods of investing in school buildings.  
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All projected long-term future ‘cash flows’ are uncertain, those for F and S as well 
as those for V, in that all depend on assuming real prices or real wages behave in 
future as they have done in the past. The additional elements of uncertainty 
present in the forecasts for V and not in those for F and S are essentially two-fold: 
the rate of decay of the effect of rebuilding on exam results of a school; and the 
actual level of final qualification obtained by those pupils raised over the 5+ A*-C 
GCSE threshold. 
 
It would now be appropriate and timely to revisit the rate of change in exam 
results in the sample of schools rebuilt before 2006 that were studied in Rintala 
(2010), for which at least seven years of post-rebuilding results should by now be 
available. This would throw more light upon the ‘rate of decay’ of the exam 
improvement effect. It would also be most useful to have an educational study of a 
confidential sample of all pupils obtaining, a few years ago, just better than 5+ 
A*-C GCSEs, to establish the actual final qualification outcomes for members of 
that sample. 
 
Data on the quality of schools buildings should soon be made available by the 
Education Funding Agency, following a comprehensive survey of large parts of 
the estate (Property data survey programme, n.d.). This is in part thanks to the 
calls of Sebastian James (2011) for continual assessment of the quality of the 
estate as a means of guiding investment.  This will be useful in controlling for one 
missing link in this analysis, that link being of observed building quality 
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indicators associated with the outcomes of users. This data should be accessed and 
examined by researchers to investigate these causal links with a view to further 
informing policy. Returns to investment in school rebuilding do not take the form 
of cost saving. However, it is possible that the similar levels of expenditure on F 
found in rebuilt and non-rebuilt schools imply that higher maintenance standards 
are being set and achieved in the former. To know whether or not that is the case, 
it would be necessary to have good longitudinal school building condition survey 
data for a large sample of schools. 
 
The increasingly devolved nature of school investment could prove to be counter-
productive to maintaining a whole estate (national) perspective. The costs of this 
potential lack of co-ordination of investment, aimed at greatest overall return, are 
as yet unclear.  
 
The considerable dispersion of outcomes in terms of change in examination 
results between the rebuilt school would seem to indicate the need for further 
inter-disciplinary research. This might include management, educational and 
design research focused upon those rebuilt schools where the improvement in 
educational performance has been greatest. This may identify which, if any, 
common management, educational and design factors tended to be present in 
these ‘successful’ cases. 
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The role of procurement methods remain a key area for further analysis. While 
sampled data within this study was insufficient to inform this area presently, 
further work with the diverse range of datasets applied is ongoing. 
 
What is perhaps most startling to economists, given to assuming (or hoping) that 
calculative rationality underlies major public resource allocation decisions, is the 
lack in the UK of any public body (other than the National Audit Office and 
Public Accounts Committee on ad hoc bases) charged with systematically 
collecting and analysing all the evidence (much already being collected in 
different bits of government) that could, and should, be used to make ex post 
evaluations of investment programmes. Such a body could estimate policy 
outcomes compared with those anticipated in the business cases, and further 
increase transparency in assessing whether project business cases do indeed 
contain anticipated measurable outcomes and anticipated values for impact of 
these. 
 
Finally, with the passage of time, data on exam results will become available for 
more elapsed years after the ‘great rebuilding’ of the second half of the last 
decade. At least, this would be the case except for the fact that 5 A*-C GCSEs in 
any subject, including equivalent vocational qualifications, is no longer the 
preferred official measure of schools’ performance, whilst the preferred new 
measure is not available for years before its introduction, so that it may become 
harder for researchers to extract comparable information for the relevant whole 
period. Nevertheless, it should still be possible for future research to model the 
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impact-decay function with far more confidence and accuracy, and this may result 
in major revisions to the provisional results reported here for benefit / cost ratios. 
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i The government department responsible for schools in England and Wales has 
recently changed name several times. Before 2001 it was the Dept. for Education 
and Employment (DfEE); from 2001 to 2007 the Dept. for Education and Skills 
(DfES); from 2007 to 2010 the Dept. for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF); 
and since 2010 it has been called the Dept. for Education (DfE). In this paper the 
abbreviation used varies according to the period of the reference. 
ii Refurbishment includes schools where between 50% and a 100% of the school’s 
floor area had undergone capital works. 
iii GCSEs are General Certificates of Secondary Education and are the standard 
qualification for assessing academic progress in UK secondary schools. Typically, 
pupils study towards these between the ages of 14 to 16. Normally, qualifications 
are pursued in between 8 and 12 separate chosen subject areas, subject to the 
requirement  that pupils study English (Literature and Languages), Mathematics, 
Sciences and increasingly often at least one modern foreign language. The 
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coverage of GCSEs is designed around a national curriculum and is graded from 
A*-G. GCSE results are used by many school sixth forms and further education 
colleges for assessing admission onto courses leading to A and AS-levels, A 
levels being the standard qualification resulting from 16-19 year old education. 
These A and AS-levels are the principal criteria for entry into higher education 
university degree programs. Pupils typically take between 2 and 5 A levels over 
two years of further education, in combination with the single year AS-level 
qualifications (essentially, the first year of A levels). GCSEs (5 A*-C), A / AS-
levels, and Bachelor degrees constitute levels 2, 3 and 4 respectively in the 
Qualifications and Credit Framework for England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
iv Other admissions types excluded included ‘selective’, ‘modern’ and ‘N/A’. This 
step also removed Academies as well as Welsh establishments from the sample, as 
they did not have sufficient admission type data. 
v Survey undertaken by DfE, completed by local authorities and provided to us by 
Partnerships for Schools. 
vi Detailed descriptions of what each expenditure line includes can be found on the 
School Financial Benchmarking website: 
https://sfb.teachernet.gov.uk/Assets/metrichelp.htm#I01 
vii Provided in the initial Edubase.gov dataset of educational establishments in 
England and Wales. 
viii The subsamples for investigating both the cost ratios and investment returns for 
F, S and V are somewhat smaller than the initial C sample. The reasons for this 
include the following. For the cost ratio data, F and S seem to loose some 69 
schools from the initial C sample. These can be broken down into 3 schools that 
were seemingly rebuilt too early for us to observe 3 years post rebuild data, 35 
schools with incomplete data for a full F or S calculation (refer to method for 
constituent expenditures) and 31 schools for which there was no data reported in 
any year, likely the result of failure to match between datasets based on imperfect 
unique identifiers. The loss of an additional 41 and 43 schools for the investment 
appraisal of F and S respectively, is down to lack of reporting of constituent 
expenditures as well as some schools having been rebuilt too recently for us to 
have 3 years post rebuild data. As for the sub samples used for the investment 
appraisal looking at V, 76 schools were lost from the initial larger C sample. 
These can be broken down into 1 school which was rebuild too early to have 
amassed three years pre rebuild educational attainment data, 47 schools that were 
rebuilt too recently to have amassed post rebuild data, 7 schools which seemingly 
report no pre rebuild educational attainment and are assumingly completely new, 
and a remaining 21 schools that do not provide sufficient data both before and 
after rebuild. In some cases, failure to be included within the samples is the result 
of failure for datasets to match appropriately (unfortunately unique identifier can 
change for a number of reasons e.g. if the school undergoes institutional change 
such as becoming an Academy). Future work with the amassing datasets, and 
specifically in terms of matching efficiency and imputing reasonable values for 
missing cells, would assist in improving the sample sizes and hence the basis for 
our conclusions.  
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ix The actual sample behind the DfE cost data is as yet unpublished by the 
Department. Work continues to collate these data sources in building datasets for 
further empirical analysis of the school estate. 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 – Discussion of reasons why estimations of outcome values might 
differ from those that actually occur 
Under-estimation: 
 
 Improvements in educational attainment that do not move 16 year-old pupils 
over the level 2 thresholds have been ignored (see above for discussion). 
 Increase in lifetime earnings of those obtaining qualifications may not fully 
capture the economic benefits resulting from an economy having a more 
highly qualified work force. There may be benefits captured by employers, 
and / or important spillover benefits, captured by others. 
 It is assumed that the effect of school renewal investment on improving 
educational attainment starts to decay after 3 years have elapsed, decaying to 
zero over 17 more years (i.e. 20 years after construction), and at a rate of 
1/17th per annum. This is assumption, rather than estimation based on actual 
observed long-term results, such results not being available for analysis. If 
improved premises had their effect on attainment in isolation from other 
factors affecting attainment, this assumption might be right. However, it 
seems more likely that complex dynamic interdependencies (with factors such 
as school intake, leadership, organizational culture, public perceptions and 
morale) are at work, meaning that some rebuilt schools are ‘transformed’ 
whilst others are not. Physical renewal of buildings would then work by 
increasing the chance for such a positive transformation to occur, without even 
being a necessary, still less a sufficient, condition for it. In the transformed 
schools, positive cumulative causation may occur, so that rather than 
beginning to decay after 3 years, as the premises begin to age, the effects on 
attainment continue to become stronger as time passes. Unfortunately, because 
the majority of the renewals for which there is data occurred only a few years 
ago, there is not (yet) sufficient data on post-investment attainment after say 
10 elapsed years on enough schools to observe the details the longer-term 
trends.  Instead data for 3 elapsed years was chosen as the period to measure 
change in attainment, in order to give better sample size. Thus, if positive 
cumulative causation occurs frequently, the method adopted will under-
estimate total benefits. 
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Over-estimation: 
 Lifetime earning increments are measured using retrospective data, and are 
thus reported at the levels they have been over the last several decades, 
including those reaching 16 in, say, 1960 and retiring in, say, 2010. There are 
some plausible reasons to think that the increments that will be obtained by 
those reaching 16 in say 2010 may be significantly lower. These reasons 
revolve around the idea that UK economic growth may be slower than it has 
been, for macroeconomic reasons, and that it is growth that creates skill 
shortages and raises wage premiums for possessing qualifications. Also, the 
wage premium data refer to a period when a much smaller proportion of the 
workforce possessed university degrees. On the other hand, there are also 
reasons to see stronger forces in the future than in the past tending to hold 
down the rate of increase of earnings for those without qualifications, and 
thus, perhaps, its level relative to the earnings of those with qualifications. 
First, it must be remembered that the past period includes the introduction of 
the national minimum wage. More general factors include reduced future 
demand for unskilled labour in the UK relative to its supply. 
 Because the data is not available to allow its estimation, we have ignored the 
marginal costs of providing post-16 education to an increased number of 
students, i.e. to pupils moving over the level 2 threshold. Ideally, these should 
be estimated and then either be deducted from the earnings increment or added 
to the cash outflows. 
 The threshold-and-national-average method may overstate the likely actual 
proportion of pupils raised above the level 2 threshold who will go on to 
obtain degrees. That is, what holds for all those with 5+ A*-C GCSEs may not 
hold for the ‘marginal’ pupils, who may be raised just above that threshold but 
may have a below average A level achievement. 
 The role of vocational qualifications is not incorporated into the analysis, in 
part due to complications raised by their existence parallel to academic ones. 
Separate findings do exist that show lower lifetime earnings uplifts for those 
with each level of vocational rather than academic qualifications. Since a far 
from negligible proportion of students at each level do in fact obtain the 
vocational qualifications, this creates a problem. However, the method of 
deducing y and z required introduction of this over-simplification. It is 
difficult to deduce what separate proportions of students with vocational and 
academic level 2 stop at that level, stop at level 3 or go on to level 4. Thus, the 
analysis for earnings uplifts at present applies to all students the uplifts found 
for those (the great majority) pursuing academic qualifications. 
 Flattening-out the actually crescent-shaped graph area for lifetime earnings 
premiums (the area between life time earning curves for unqualified and 
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qualified workers (Walker and Zhu, 2013)). To simplify, estimation of ‘cash 
flows’ average premiums over the whole age range are applied to workers of 
all ages. It is in fact known in general terms that premiums reach their 
maximum for workers aged around 40. For younger and older workers they 
are somewhat less. This simplification therefore overstates actual ‘cash flow’ 
benefits in the first 20 years and last 20 (i.e. 40 to 60 years on) after the 
investment in school renewal and understates benefits in the middle 20 years. 
When discounted, therefore, the PV of the total sum of benefit flows appears 
somewhat greater than it would if it were possible to input data reflecting 
accurate annual wage uplift curves. The fact that the discount rate in this case 
is only 3.5%, however, partially moderates the size of this over-estimation. 
For further research, it would be desirable to input alternative assumptions 
about the equation for the crescent area between earnings curves to explore the 
sensitivity of estimates of V to this. 
Overall, at present, it is only possible to take the somewhat heroic view that 
perhaps the two sets of factors will roughly balance out.  
 
 
 
Tables and Figures: 
 
Table 1: Example of 1/5/200: London offices 
 
Source: (Ive, 2006) derived from Evans et al, 1998.
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Table 2: Resource costs to all parties (London offices), discounted at 7%; not 
1:5:200 but rather 1:1.5:15 
 
Source: (Ive, 2006)
 
Table 3: Examples of outputs and outcomes 
        
Source: Green book (HM Treasury, 2011)
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Table 4: Summary of reasons for possible over / under estimation of project 
value 
 
 
Direction 
  
Source Cause 
  
Under est. 
  
Particular 
method 
Improvements in educational attainment that 
do not move 16 year olds over the level 2 
threshold 
 
Under est. 
 
  
Keynesian 
uncertainty 
Higher lifetime wages may not capture full 
benefits to the economy of having more highly 
skilled labour 
 
Under est. Lack of data Uncertain decay of effect on educational 
attainment  
 
Over est. Keynesian 
uncertainty 
The earning premiums associated with certain 
qualifications in the past may be quite different 
in the future 
 
Over est. Lack of data The marginal cost of further education has 
been ignored 
 
Over est. Lack of data 
& particular 
method 
 
Over statement of number of marginal students 
actually going on to higher education 
Over est. Particular 
method 
Role of vocational qualifications not 
incorporated into the analysis 
 
Over est. Lack of data 
& particular 
method 
 
Flattening out of the life time earning 
premiums rather than being sensitive to stage 
of career 
 
 
Table 5: Declining long term discount rate 
 
Source: (HM Treasury, 2011)
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Table 6: Data source and information 
Dataset Source Period Information 
Edubase Department 
for Education 
(DfE) 
Full extract 
of database 
made on 
18th January 
2012 
A comprehensive list of all 
educational establishments 
within England and Wales (in 
effect, the population of all 
schools). This source also 
provides ‘pupil capacity’ for 
each school. 
Schools 
Building 
Survey 2009, 
2011 (SBS) 
Partnerships 
for Schools 
(Now the 
Education 
Funding 
Agency) 
2009 & 
2011 
A range of data including 
identifying those schools which 
have received significant capital 
investment – ‘rebuilding’ (along 
with year), as well as estimates 
for work done (CAPEX ‘C’ £s). 
Consistent 
Financial 
Reporting 
database 
(CFR) 
DfE 2002/03 – 
2012/13 
This is a centrally collated 
database recording the on-going 
annual expenditures at the 
school level for a range of cost 
categories. This provides the 
data for estimation of facility 
maintenance (‘F’) and staffing 
(‘S’) costs. 
Educational 
attainment 
table 
DfE 1998-2013 These datasets provide data on 
educational outcomes used to 
estimate ‘V’, as well as some 
data on characteristics of pupils, 
such as % on free school meals 
(FSM) and pupils on roll for 
capacity utilisation ratios and 
variance analysis. 
Display 
Energy 
certificates 
(DEC) 
DfE 2008 – 2012 This source provides total usable 
floor area (TUFA) for a limited 
coverage of our schools, 
sufficient to provide insight on 
m2 to pupil ratios and variance. 
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Table 7: Steps in calculating expected CAPEX for school works 
Step Method Data source 
1. Estimate school 
size in m2 
Take reported pupil capacity of 
school and multiply this by the 
minimum guidance space for 
schools (accounting for whether 
they include post 16 facilities). 
Pupil capacity – \ 
(Dept for Education, 
2012)) 
Space guidance – 
Building Bulletin 98 
(DfES, 1998)  
2. Multiply 
estimated school 
size by cost per m2 
indicators 
Take estimated m2 and multiply 
by EC Harris cost indicators for 
school buildings (with 
adjustment for London prices) 
EC Harris cost 
indicators (EC 
Harris, 2006)  
3. Normalise to 
CAPEX per unit of 
pupil capacity 
Divide CAPEX per school at 
2009 prices by the school’s 
pupil capacity to obtain CAPEX 
per pupil capacity unit 
Pupil capacity – 
(Dept for Education, 
2012) 
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Table 8. Variable sample size and period coverage 
Variable 
estimate 
Sample 
size 
Period coverage 
C 166 1997-2012 (SBS 2009 / 2011) 
F 97 (56) 3 years before rebuild within 2002/03 – 
2012/13 CFR (and 3 years after) 
S 97 (54) 3 years before rebuild within 2002/03 – 
2012/13 CFR (and 3 years after) 
V 90 3 years before and after rebuild within 
1998 – 2013 
 
Figure 1: Annual reported capital expenditure and number of projects within 
C:166 sample (2009 prices, £m)  
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* Note n = 165, one school was renewed in 1999, which is not included above.
Table 9: Cost ratios – c, f and s (normalised) 
PV cost per pupil 
capacity 
(£)   
c 20,497  
St Dev 6,383  
n 166  
 Discount rate 
 3.50% 7% 
f 16,380 9,219 
St Dev 5,841 3,288 
n 97 97 
s 91,088 51,266 
St Dev 19,402 10,919 
n 97 97 
 
Table 10: C sample variance in key construction ratios and capacity utilisation 
rate 
Variance 
on key 
ratios 
Reported 
CAPEX 
per pupil 
capacity 
unit (£s) 
Reported 
CAPEX 
per pupil 
on roll in 
2012 (£s) 
Reported 
CAPEX 
per 
TUFA 
m2 (£s) 
TUFA 
(m2) per 
Pupil on 
roll 2012 
TUFA 
per pupil 
capacity 
unit (m2) 
Capacity 
utilisation 
rate (Pupils 
on roll 2012 
/ capacity) 
Average 20,497 27,266 3,552 9.24 8.38 0.87 
St Dev 6383 27925 5705 3.40 3.41 0.22 
n 166 166 56 56 56 166 
Min 3,672 3,679 703 0.79 0.72 0.12 
Max 39,267 298,361 43,324 18.77 24.38 1.97 
Percentile              
10th  12,578 14,038 1,466 6.8 4.2 0.61 
20th 14,929 17,172 1,750 7.3 6.9 0.72 
30th 17,817 19,943 1,876 7.7 7.4 0.81 
40th 19,463 21,566 2,148 8.3 7.8 0.88 
50th 20,285 22,457 2,453 9.4 8.4 0.91 
60th  21,898 24,913 2,629 9.9 9.2 0.94 
70th  22,972 27,039 3,085 10.3 9.6 0.97 
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80th  24,541 30,332 3,641 10.8 9.8 1.00 
90th 27,738 35,896 4,423 12.7 10.6 1.06 
100th  39,267 298,361 43,324 18.8 24.4 1.97 
* All monetary values are in 2009 prices 
Table 11. C sample totals and weighted means of construction ratios and capacity 
utilization rate 
Weighted 
averages 
Total 
CAPEX 
(£s) / Total 
pupil 
capacity 
Total 
CAPEX 
(£s) / Total 
no. pupils 
on roll 
Total 
CAPEX (£s) 
/ Total 
usable floor 
area (m2) 
Total usable 
floor area 
(m2) / Total 
no. pupils 
on roll 
(2012) 
Total usable 
floor area 
(m2) / Total 
pupil 
capacity 
Total no. of 
pupils / 
Total pupil 
capacity 
Average 19,982 23,282 2,550 8.62 7.95 0.86 
Total 
numerator 
3,872 mn 3,872 mn 1,289 mn 505,764 505,764 166,316 
Total 
denominator 
193,781 166,316 505,764 58,691 63,589 193,781 
sample n 166 166 56 56 56 166 
* All monetary values are in 2009 prices m2 
Table 12: Construction price m2 BSF schools – 2009 prices 
Construction price 
per square metre 
BSF (2q 2009 prices) 
GIFA m2 Average 20th percentile 80th percentile 
0-2000  £2,851   £2,021   £3,712  
2000-4000  £2,780   £1,999   £3,442  
4000-6000  £2,566   £1,914   £3,033  
6000-8000  £2,303   £2,132   £2,508  
8000-10000  £2,158   £1,863   £2,403  
10000-12000  £1,980   £1,837   £2,081  
12000-14000  £1,899   £1,701   £2,017  
14000-16000  £2,075   £1,845   £2,299  
16000-18000  £1,962   £1,690   £2,180  
18000-20000  £1,938   £1,786   £2,105  
Source: (DfE, 2009) 
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Figure 2: Time series actual annual f and s and change (rhs) for secondary 
comprehensives (2009 prices, £s) – 2002/03 to 2012/03 
 
 
 
Table 13: Investment returns – change in cash flow on no-rebuilding versus 
rebuilding 
PV per pupil capacity (£) 
Δc -20,497 
St Dev 6,383 
n 166 
  
Discount rate 3.50% 
Δf -189 
St Dev 2,914 
n 56 
Δs -840 
St Dev 6,961 
n 54 
Δv 73,323 
St Dev 272,024 
n 90 
Δt (v x Tax Rate*) 29,329 
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St Dev 108,809 
N 90 
* Tax rate = 0.4 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of annual value of outcome per school (t1-t60, n =90, £m) 
 
 
 
 
